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Abstract
Let V be the set of all combinations of expected value of finite objective functions from
designing information. I showed that V is a compact and convex set implementable
by signal structures with finite support when unknown states are finite. Moreover,
Vpµq as a correspondence of prior is continuous. This result can be applied to develop
a concavification method of Lagrange multipliers that works with general constrained
optimization. It also provides tractability to a wide range of information design prob-
lems.
Keywords: concavification, method of Lagrange multipliers, Bayes persuasion,
information design
1. Introduction
Let X be a non-empty finite set (state space). ∆pXq P R|X| is the set of all probability
measure on X. Let µ denote elements in ∆pXq. ∆2pXq is the set of all probability
measures (standard Borel measurability) on ∆pXq. Let P denote elements in ∆2(X). Let 
Vi
(n
i“1
be a finite set of continuous function on ∆pXq. Let f : Rn Ñ R be a continuous
function. Let Dpµq : ∆pXq Ñ Rn be closed valued.
My objective is to solve the following constrained maximization problem:
sup
PP∆2pXq
f
´
EPrV
1s, . . . , EPrV
ns
¯
(1)
s.t.
$&%
´
EPrV
1s, . . . , EPrV
ns
¯
P Dpµq
EPrνs “ µ
Suppose n “ 1 and D ” R, then Equation (1) can be solved by concavifying V1pµq
(Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), Aumann et al. (1995)). And Theorem 8 implies that
it is without loss to consider optimal information structure involving signal number no
more than |X|. This gives tractability both analytically and computationally. However,
even when n “ 2, with a general f or a nontrivial constraint D, concavification no
longer works and we might need to search over an infinite dimensional space to solve
Equation (1).
To solve Equation (1), I studied the set of all possible combinations of expected
valuation that can be implemented by designing information P. In Section 3, I proved a
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two-step concavification method: First, the information design possibility set itself can
be implemented by combining finite number of information structures that implement
its extreme points. Second, each extreme point can be implemented by concavifying a
linear combination of Vi’s, thus involves only finite number of signals.
The general concavification method developed in this paper can be applied to a
wide range of information design problems. In Section 4, I first provide two applica-
tions in static information acquisition and dynamic information acquisition to show
that the optimal solutions have a nice Lagrange multiplier characterization. Then I
provide an application of persuading receivers with outside options to illustrate how
the Lagrange characterization can simplify the optimization problem. Finally I pro-
vide an application of Lemma 1 in a setup of screening using information structures,
to illustrate how the dimensionality of the problem can be reduced to make the prob-
lem tractable.
2. Information possibility set
Notations used: given a convex set C, extpCq is set of extreme points of C, extkpCq is
set of k-extreme points of C 1. exppCq is set of exposed points of C. FpCq is set of faces
of C.
Definition 1. Information possibility set Vpµq P Rn is defined as:
Vpµq “
"´
EPrV
1s, . . . , EPrV
ns
¯ ˇˇˇˇ
P P ∆2pXq, EPrνs “ µ
*
Lemma 1. @µ, Vpµq is a compact and convex set. @v P extkpVpµqq, there exists P P ∆
2pXq
such that: #
v “
`
EPrV
1s, . . . , EPrV
ns
˘
|supppPq| ď pk` 1q |X|
Proof. First of all, we prove that Vpµq is compact and convex.
• Boundedness: @P P ∆2pXq, minµP∆pXqV
ipµq ď EPrV
is ď maxµP∆pXqV
ipµq. There-
fore, @v P Vpµq, it is bounded from 0 by maxµP∆pXq,i
ˇˇ
Vipµq
ˇˇ
by sup norm. So Vpµq
is a bounded set.
• Convexity: @v1, v2 P Vpµq, there exists P1, P2 P D
2pXq s.t. vi “
`
EPirV
1s, . . . , EPirV
ns
˘
.
Since ∆2pXq is a linear space and expectation operator is linear functional, @β P
r0, 1s, Pβ “ βP1 ` p1´ βqP2 P ∆
2pXq and:
vβ “
´
EPβrV
1s, . . . , EPβrV
ns
¯
“β
´
EP1rV
1s, . . . , EP1rV
ns
¯
` p1´ βq
´
EP2rV
1s, . . . , EP2rV
ns
¯
“βv1 ` p1´ βqv2
Therefore, βv1 ` p1´ βqv2 P Vpµq so Vpµq is a convex set.
1 extpCq “
Ť
kăn extkpCq and C “
Ť
kďn extkpCq.
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• Closeness: ∆pXq is a finite dimensional simplex. If we consider Prokhorov metric
on ∆2pXq, then ∆2pXq is a complete and separable space (Theorem 6.8 of Billings-
ley (2013)). Now since ∆pXq is compact, by Theorem 9, ∆2pXq is a compact, com-
plete and separable space with Prokhorov metric. Prokhorov metric induces a
topology equivalent to weak˚ topology(by Theorem 6.8 of Billingsley (2013)). So
@vk P Vpµq, if vk Ñ v, then consider the sequence Pk such that vk “ EPk
“
pViq
‰
.
By compactness of ∆2pXq, pick a subsequence Pk
w´˚
ÝÝÝÑ P. Then @Vi, since Vi is
continuous, EPkrV
is Ñ EPrV
is. So v P Vpµq and Vpµq is a closed set.
• Compactness: Vpµq is a finite dimensional bounded and closed set, so it is com-
pact.
@v P extkpVpµqq, v is an interior point of a k-dimensional face F of Vpµq. Then
by Theorem 7, v P conv pextpFqq. By Theorem 8, there exists
 
vj
(k`1
j“1
Ă extpFq andř
pij “ 1 s.t.
ř
pijvj “ v. By Lemma 4,
 
vj
(
Ă extpVpµqq. The next step is to prove that
@j, there exists Pj P ∆
2pXq s.t. vj “
`
EPrV
1s, . . . , EPrV
ns
˘
and
ˇˇ
supppPjq
ˇˇ
ď |X|.
Lemma 2. @µ, @v P exppVpµqq, DP P ∆2pXq and |supppPq| ď |X| s.t. v “ EP
“
pViq
‰
.
Proof. By definition of exposed points, there exists a linear function l P LpRnq s.t.
lpvq ą lpv1q @v1 P Vpxq, v1 ‰ v
In finite dimensional space, a linear function lpvq can be equivalently written as
ř
λivi`
c. Consider the following maximization problem:
sup
PP∆2pXq
EP
”ÿ
λiV
i ` c
ı
(2)
s.t. EPrνs “ µ
By Theorem 8, Equation (2) can be solved by convexifying the graph of
ř
λiV
ipµq ` c.
The maximum is achieved by a P s.t. |supppPq| ď |X|. Of course EPrpV
iqs P Vpµq. Then
by definition of l, lpvq ě EP
“ř
λiV
i ` c
‰
. On the other hand, there exists P1 P ∆2pXq
s.t. v “ EP1
“
pViq
‰
, by optimality of P, lpvq ď EP
“ř
λiV
i ` c
‰
. Therefore, since v is
the unique element in Vpµq achieving lpvq, we have EPrpV
iqs “ v and |supppPq| ď
|X|. Q.E.D.
@vj P extpVpµqq, by Theorem 6, there exists
 
vjl
(8
l“1
Ă exppVpµqq and limlÑ8 v
jl “
vj. By Lemma 2, there exists Pjl P ∆2pXq s.t.
ˇˇ
supppPjlq
ˇˇ
ď |X| and vjl “ EPjl
“
pViq
‰
.
Now each Pjl can be represented as
´
p
jl
t , µ
jl
t
¯|X|
t“1
P R2|X|, where:$’&’’%
ř
t p
jl
t “ 1ř
t p
jl
t µ
jl
t “ µř
t p
jl
t V
ipµ
jl
t q “ v
jl
i @i
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Since
´
p
jl
t , µ
jl
t
¯
is in finite dimensional vector space, there exists a subsequence con-
verging to
´
p
j
t, µ
j
t
¯
when l Ñ 8. Therefore, since Vi is each continuous, it is easy to
verify that: $’’&’’%
ř
t p
j
t “ 1ř
t p
j
tµ
j
t “ µř
t p
j
tV
ipµ
j
tq “ v
j
i @i
Therefore, vj is implemented by Pj P ∆2pXq and
ˇˇ
supppPjq
ˇˇ
ď |X|. So P “
ř
pijP
j P
∆2pXq and |supppPq| ď pk ` 1q ¨ |X|. By linearity of expectation operator, EP
“
pViq
‰
“ř
pijEPj
“
pViq
‰
“
ř
pijv
j “ v. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. Correspondence V : ∆pXq Ñ Rn is continuous. GrpVq is convex and compact.
Proof.
• Boundedness: ∆pxq is a bounded set. @µ P ∆pXq, V is uniformly bounded by
radious maxµP∆pXq,i
ˇˇ
Vipµq
ˇˇ
by sup norm. So GrpVq is bounded.
• Convexity: @pµ1, v1q, pµ2, v2q P GrpVq. @α P r0, 1s. Since ∆pXq is convex, µα “
αµ1 ` p1 ´ αqµ2 P ∆pXq. Now we prove that vα “ αv1 ` p1 ´ αqv2 P Vpµαq.
By definition, there exists P1, P2 P ∆
2pXq s.t. EP1r
`
Vi
˘
s “ v1, EP1rνs “ µ1 and
EP2
“
pviq
‰
“ v2, EP2rνs “ µ2. Define Pα “ αP1 ` p1 ´ αqP2, then by linearity
of expectation operator, EPαrνs “ αEP1rνs ` p1 ´ αqEP2rνs “ µα. EPα
“
pViq
‰
“
αEP1rpV
iqs ` p1´ αqEP2rpV
iqs “ vα. Therefore, vα P Vpµαq. So pµα, vαq P GrpVq.
• Closedness: @
 
pµj, vjq
(
Ă GrpVq, suppose µj Ñ µ, vj Ñ v. Want to show that
µ P ∆pXq and v P Vpµq. First of all, since ∆pXq is complete, µ P ∆pXq. Now by
Lemma 1, there exists
`
pj, νj
˘
such that:$’’&’%
řpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
k
j “ 1řpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
k
j ν
k
j “ µjřpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
k
jV
ipνkj q “ v
i
j
Now since pj P ∆ ppn` 1q |X|q and νj P ∆pXq are both compact spaces. Consider
stadard Euclideanmetric on product space ∆ ppn` 1q |X|qˆ∆pXqpn`1q|X|, it is also
compact. Therefore there exists convergincing subsequence pj Ñ p and ν
k
j Ñ ν
k.
Then $’’&’’%
řpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
k “ limjÑ8
řpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
k
j “ 1řpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
kνk “ limjÑ8
řpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
k
j ν
k
j “ limjÑ8 µj “ µřpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
kVipνkq “ limjÑ8
řpn`1q|X|
k“1 p
k
jV
ipνkj q “ limjÑ8 v
i
j “ v
i
Therefore, pp, νq implements v at µ. So v P Vpµq.
• Compactness: Since GrpVq is closed and bounded, it is compact.
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• Continuity: Since GrpVq is compact, Vpµq is upper hemicontinuous. Now we
only need to show lower hemicontinuity. @ pµmq Ă ∆pXq, µm Ñ µ P ∆pXq. @v P
Vpµq. By Lemma 1, v is impelemnted by pp, νqwith support size pn`1q |X|. There
exists a stochastic matrix qjk such that:$&%νj “
1ř
k µkqjk
pµ1qj1, . . . , µ´1qj,´1q
pj “
ř
k µkqjk
ùñ
$’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’%
Bpj
µk
“ qjk
Bνjl
Bµk
“
$’’’&’’’’%
pjqjl ´ µlq
2
jl
p2j
when k “ l
´µlqjlqjk
p2j
when k ‰ l
Therefore, since each pj ą 0, when µm is sufficiently close to µ, correspond-
ing ppm, νmq will be bounded from pp, νq by |µ´ µm|. By continuity of V
i, vm “`ř
pmV
ipνmq
˘
Ñ
`ř
pVipνq
˘
“ v. Therefore, Vpµq is both upper hemicontinuous
and lower hemicontinuous.
Q.E.D.
3. Main theorem
3.1. Existence and finite support
Theorem 1. Let X be a non-empty state space,
 
Vi
(n
i“1
Ă C∆pXq, f P CRn. @µ P ∆pXq, sup-
pose Vpµq
Ş
Dpµq ‰ H, then there exists P˚ P ∆2pXq solving Equation (1) and |supppP˚q| ď
pn` 1q ¨ |X|.
Proof. By definition of Vpµq, Equation (1) is equivalent to the following problem:
sup
vPD
Ş
Vpµq
f pvq (3)
By Lemma 1, Vpµq is a compact set. Then Vpµq
Ş
Dpµq is compact and non-empty. By
Wierestrass’s theorem, there exists v˚ P Vpµq
Ş
Dpµq solving Equation (3). Then by
Lemma 1, there exists P˚ P ∆2pXq s.t. v˚ “
`
EP˚rV
1s, . . . , EP˚rV
ns
˘
and |supppP˚q| ď
pn` 1q ¨ |X|. Therefore, P˚ solves Equation (1). Q.E.D.
3.2. Necessary condition of optimizer
Theorem 2. Let X be a non-empty state space,
 
Vi
(n
i“1
Ă C∆pXq, f : Rn Ñ R is differen-
tiable. Let D ” Rn. Then a necessary condition for P˚ solving Equation (1) is:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
∇ f pEP˚rV
1s, . . . , EP˚rV
nsq ¨
´
EPrV
1s, . . . , EPrV
ns
¯
(4)
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Proof. Solving Equation (1) is equivalent to solving Equation (3). Suppose by contra-
diction that Equation (4) is violated at optimal P˚. Then it is equivalently saying that
there exists v P Vpµq such that:
∇ f pv˚q ¨ v˚ ă ∇ f pv˚q ¨ v
By Lemma 1, Vpµq is a convex set. Therefore vα “ p1´ αqv
˚ ` αv P Vpµq. Consider
hpαq “ f pvαq. Then h
1p0q “ ∇ f pv˚q ¨ pv´ v˚q ą 0. So there exists α1 ą 0 s.t. hpα1q ą hp0q.
Then f pv˚q ă f pvα1q. Contradicting optimality of v
˚. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3. Let X be a non-empty state space,
 
Vi
(n`m
i“1
Ă C∆pXq, f : Rn`m Ñ R is
constant in last m arguments. Let D ”
 
v|vi ě 0 @i ą n
(
. Then there exists P˚ solving
Equation (1) and λ P Bm`n such that:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
EP
”ÿ
λiVi
ı
Proof. @P˚ solving Equation (1), let v˚ be corresponding value. Define:
vα “ v
˚ ` αp0, . . . , 0loomoon
n
, 1, . . . , 1loomoon
m
q
Then by definition f pvαq “ f pv
˚q. v0 “ v
˚ P Vpµq. Since Vpµq is bounded, for large
enough α, vα R Vpµq. Then since Vpµq is compact, there exists α s.t. vα P BVpµq. Since
Vpµq is convex, there exists l P LpRm`nq s.t. vα P argmaxvPVpµq lpvq. Let l “
ř
λivi,
then:
vα P arg max
vPVpµq
ÿ
λivi
Let Pα be the corresponding information structure implementing vα (existence of Pα
guaranteed by Lemma 1). Then
Pα P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
EP
”ÿ
λiVi
ı
Since f pvαq “ f pv
˚q, Pα solves Equation (1) as well. Q.E.D.
3.3. Convex optimization
Theorem 4. Let X be a non-empty state space,
 
Vi
(n
i“1
Ă C∆pXq, D ” tv|gpvq ě 0u. If
both f and g are quasi-concave and continuous, then there exists P˚ solving Equation (1),
v˚ “ pEPrV
isq and λ P Bn such that:$’’&’’%
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
EP
”ÿ
λiVi
ı
v˚ P arg min
f pvqě f pv˚q,vPD
λ ¨ v
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Proof. First, by Theorem 1, P˚ solving Equation (1) exists. Then by optimality of P˚:
Vpµq
č
tv|v P D, f pvq ą f pv˚qu “ H
Since f and g are quasi-convex, tv|v P D, f pvq ą f pv˚qu is a convex set. Then by sepa-
rating hyperplane theorem, there exists c and λ s.t. @v P Vpµq, v1 P D and f pv1q ą f pv˚q:
λ ¨ v ď c and λ ¨ v1 ą c
By continuity of f and g, v˚ P cl ptv|v P D, f pvq ą f pv˚quq. So λ ¨ v˚ “ c. Then it is easy
to verify that λ satisfies the conditions in Theorem 4. Q.E.D.
Corollary 4.1. Let X be a non-empty state space,
 
Vi
(n
i“1
Ă C∆pXq, f : Rn Ñ R is quasi-
concave. Let D ” tv|gpvq ě 0u, g is quasi-concave. If f and g are both differentiable, then
there exists P˚ solving Equation (1), v˚ “ pEPrV
isq and γ, η ě 0 such that:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
pη∇ f pv˚q ` γ ¨ Jgpv˚qq ¨
´
EPrV
1s, ¨ ¨ ¨ , EPrV
ns
¯
Proof. By Theorem 4:
v˚ P arg min
f pvqě f pv˚q,vPD
λ ¨ v (5)
It is easy to verify that Equation (5) as a dual problem is a convex optimization prob-
lem. Since both f and g are differentiable, by Kuhn-Tucker condition, there exists
γ, η ě 0 such that:
λ´ η ¨∇ f pv˚q ´ γ ¨ Jgpv˚q “ 0
Then by definition of λ:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
pη∇ f pv˚q ` γ ¨ Jgpv˚qq ¨
´
EPrV
1s, ¨ ¨ ¨ , EPrV
ns
¯
Q.E.D.
3.4. Maximum theorem
Theorem 5. Let X be a non-empty state space,
 
Vi
(n
i“1
Ă C∆pXq, f P CRn. Suppose Dpµq
is a continuous correspondence and @µ P ∆pXq, Vpµq
Ş
Dpµq ‰ H. Let κpµq be maximum
in Equation (1) and Ppµq be solution to Equation (1), then κpµq is continuous and Ppµq is
compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous2.
2with respect to Prokhorov metric.
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Proof. Theorem 5 is an application of maximum theorem. Since by Lemma 3 Vpµq
and Dpµq are both continuous, Vpµq
Ş
Dpµq is non-empty, compact valued and con-
tinuous. Equation (1) is equivalent to maximizing f pvq on Vpµq
Ş
Dpµq. Therefore,
by maximum theorem, κpµq is continuous and the argmax correspondence V˚pµq is
comapct-valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Now we show that Ppµq is compact valued and upper hemicontinuous.
• compactness: (sequential comapctness will be sufficient) @ tPmu Ă Ppµq, con-
sider vm “ EPm
“
pViq
‰
. Then vm P V
˚pµq, so there exists subsequence (without
loss assume to be vqm itself) vm Ñ v P V
˚pµq. Then since ∆2pXq is compact
by Theorem 9, there exists subsequence Pm
w´˚
ÝÝÝÑ P P ∆2pXq. Then EPrpV
iqs “
limEPmrpV
iqs “ lim vm “ v P V
˚pµq. So P P Ppµq.
• upper hemicontinuity: @µm Ñ µ, Pm
w´˚
ÝÝÝÑ P and Pm P Ppµmq. Then vm “
EPmrpV
iqs P V˚pµmq. By definition of w-
˚ convergence, vm Ñ v “ EPrpV
iqs. By
upper hemicontinuity of V˚pµq, v P V˚pµq. Therefore, P P Ppµq.
Q.E.D.
4. Applications
4.1. Costly Information acquisition
A direct application of Theorem 1 is to costly information acquisition problem.
Consider a variant of rational inattention model. Decision utility at each belief is
Fpµq “ maxa Eµrupa, xqs. Information measure of any experiment P is IpP|µq “ EPrHpµq´
Hpνqswhere H is the entropy function. Assume cost of experiments are convex in their
measure, the decision problem can be written as:
sup
PPD2pXq
EPrνs“µ
EP rFpνqs ´ f pEP rHpµq ´ Hpνqsq (6)
In a standard rational inattention problem, f is linear. Then standard concavification
method suggests that optimal experiment involves signals no more than |X|. The rea-
son why we want to deviate from a linear f is that standard RI has two kind of debat-
able predictions: 1) prior invariant choice of optimal posteriors (see Caplin and Dean
(2013)). 2) no dynamics if we allow repeated experiments (see Steiner et al. (2017)).
However, when f is more general, say convex, we knew little about how to solve
Equation (6). Theorem 2 becomes useful.
Proposition 1. There exists P˚ solving Equation (6), |supppP˚q| “ 2 |X|. Moreover, if f is
differentiable, P˚ solves:
P˚ P arg max
PP∆2pXq
EPrνs“µ
EP
“
Fpνq ´ f 1 pEP˚rHpµq ´ Hpνqsq ¨ Hpνq
‰
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4.2. Dynamic information design
Consider the following Bellman equation:
Vpµq “ max
"
Fpµq, sup
PP∆2pXq
e´ρdtEPrVpνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq
*
(7)
s.t.
#
EPrνs “ µ
EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C
Proposition 2. If F,H P C∆pXq, f P CR. Fpxq, f pxq,C ě 0. Then there exists unique
V P C∆pXq solving Equation (7).
Proof. Let Z “ tV P C∆pXq|F ď V ď copFqu. We define operator:
TpVqpµq “ max
"
Fpµq, sup
PP∆2pXq
e´ρdtEPrVpνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq
*
(8)
s.t.
#
EPrνs “ µ
EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C
By Theorem 1, the max operator is well defined. When P “ δµ, EPrνs “ µ and
EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs “ 0 so the sup operator is also well defined. Now we prove that
T is a contraction mapping on pZ , L8q.
• TpZq Ă Z : First of all, given the outter max operator in Equation (8), TpVqpµq ě
Fpµq. Then @P P ∆2pXq such that EPrνs “ µ and EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C:
e´ρdtEPrVpνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq
ďe´ρdtEPrVpνqs
ďEPrcopFqpνqs
“copFqpµq
First inequality is from f being non-negative, second inqeuality is from V being
non-negative, e´ρdt ă 1 and V ď copFq. Last equality is from copFq being linear.
Last step is to show TpZqpµq P C∆pXq. This is directly implied by Theorem 5.
• TpVq is monotonic: SupposeUpµq ě 0 andU`V P Z If TpVqpµq “ Fpµq, then by
construction TpV `Uq ě Fpµq “ TpVqpµq. If TpVqpµq ą Fpµq, let P be solution to
Equation (8) at µ for V:
TpV `Uqpµq ěe´ρdtEPrVpνq `Upνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq
“TpVqpµq ` e´ρdtEPrUpνqs
ěTpVqpµq
And constraints EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C and EPrνs “ µ are independent of choice
of V so still satisfied.
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• TpVq is contraction. We claim that TpV ` αqpµq ď TpVqpµq ` e´ρdtα. Suppose
not true at µ. Obviously TpV ` αqpµq ą Fpµq. Then let P be the solution of
Equation (8) at µ for V ` α.
TpVqpµq ěe´ρdtEPrVpνqs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq
“e´ρdtEPrVpνq ` αs ´ f pEPrHpµq ´ Hpνqsq ´ e
´ρdtα
“TpV ` αqpµq ´ e´ρdtα
ąTpVqpµq
Similar to last part, constraints EPrHpµq ´ Hpνqs ď C and EPrνs “ µ are still
satisfied. Contradiction.
Therefore, by Blackwell condition, TpVq is a contraction mapping on Z . There exists a
unique solution V P Z solving the fixed point problem TpVq “ V. Q.E.D.
4.3. Persuade voters with outside options
Consider a politician who can strategically design a public signal to voters to influ-
ence their voting behavior (the setup in Alonso and Cmara (2016)).
Voting game: There are n ě 1 voters who chooses from a binary policy set A “
ta0, a1u. There are two states X “ tx0, x1u. Each voter gets Bernoulli utility uipa, xq
from voting for the policy a. Assume that a1 is unanimously preferred to a0 when x1 is
the true state and vice versa. The politician has state independent utility over policies
and prefers a1 strictly to a0. I assume that a0 is a default policy. For a1 to be proved,
the politician needs more than m pm ď nq voters to voter for a1. The politician can
design a signal structure to influence voters’ decisions. Equivalently, I assume that the
politician chooses a distribution over posterior beliefs P P ∆2pXq.
Outside option: Different fromAlonso and Cmara (2016), where number of potential
voters is fixed, I assume that each voter has opportunity cost ci of participating in the
voting game. Therefore, to approve the new policy, the politician should first attract
at least m voters to the game and then persuade them to vote for a1.
To simplify notation, I write all voter’s utility as functions of belief Fipµq. Let µi be
the threshold belief for each voter to vote for a1 The politician’s optimization problem
can be written as:
sup
i1,...,ik,P
EP
”
1#pµěµijqěm
ı
(9)
s.t.
#
EPrFijs ě cij
EPrνs “ µ
Notice that in Equation (9), the politician doesn’t necessarily need to exclude voters
outside of ti1, . . . , iku, so the maximum from Equation (9) must be weakly larger than
the politician’s optimal utility. On the other hand, for any strategy in Equation (9),
potentially including more voters to the voting game can only make the politician
better off. So Equation (9) exactly characterizes the politician’s optimization problem.
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For any voter, except for µi, there is another critical belief rµi:rµi ´ µrµi Fip0q ` µrµi Fiprµiq “ ci
Suppose voter observes information structure inducing posterior belief 0 and rµi, then
the voter is exactly indifferent between paying the opportunity cost and entering the
voting game and not.
Proposition 3. Let µ˚ be the smallest belief s.t. # ti|µi ě µ
˚u ě m and # ti|rµi ě µ˚u ě m,
then the optimal strategy for Equation (9) is:$&%Pp0q “
µ˚´µ
µ˚
Ppµ˚q “
µ
µ˚
and ti1, . . . , iku “ ti|min trµi, µiu ě µ˚u.
Proposition 3 states that when voters must pay opportunity cost to enter the voting
game, then there are potentially two pivotal voters. One is the one who’s most difficult
to persuade to adopt a1, and the other is the one who’s most difficult to attract to the
voting game. Both difficulty levels are measured by the location of the critical beliefs.
Proof. The key step of proving Proposition 3 is to apply Corollary 4.1 to Equation (9).
Notice that the objective function is Equation (9) is in fact an indicator function with
some threshold belief level (say µ1, which is the lowest belief to persuade at least m
voters to vote for a1). So Corollary 4.1 is directly applicable to Equation (9), and the
objective function is in the form of:ÿ
λij max
!
0, µ´ µij
)
` 1µěµ1 (10)
It is easy to see that Equation (10) is a convex function on µ P r0, µ1s and a linear
function on µ P rµ1, 1s (there is no point to include voters who will never vote for a1.).
So optimal persuasion strategy must induce either belief 0 or interior belief ν ą µ1. Of
course since at least m voters are included and persuaded, ν ě µ˚. On the other hand,
it is easy to verify that the strategy define by µ˚ induces at leastm voters to participate,
so µ˚ is optimal. Q.E.D.
4.4. Screening with information
Consider a problem of Bayesian persuasion with unknown receiver types. Let Θ be
the set of receiver types, X be the finite set of states and A be the set of actions. @θ P Θ,
decision utility at each belief is Fθpµq “ maxa Eµrupa, x, θqs. Sender’s utility at each
belief given receiver type θ is Vθpµq. Assume that the type distribution is pipθq P ∆pΘq.
The sender can screen the receivers by providing a menu of information structures.
Then by revelation principle, sender’s optimization problem is:
sup
PθPΘˆ∆2pXq
ż
EPθ rVθspipθqdθ (11)
11
s.t.
#
EPθ rFθs ě EPθ1 rFθs @θ, θ
1 P Θ
EPθ rνs “ µ @θ P Θ
When Θ and A are both infinite, solving Equation (11) is difficult due to the dimen-
sionality of strategy space. When A is finite, it is WLOG to restrict the sender to use
direct message which suggests the actions being played conditional on the state. Then
Equation (11) reduces to a screening problemwith finite dimensional strategy function
(plus a few more obedience constraints). In the remaining case where Θ is finite but
A is infinite, it is still unclear whether it is WLOG to consider only finite dimensional
screening mechanisms.
Now consider the finite Θ case. Suppose Θ “ t1, . . . ,Nu. Define:$’&’%
Vipµq “
"
EPrVis, EPrF1s, . . . , EPrFNs
ˇˇˇˇ
P P ∆2pXq, EPrνs “ µ
*
Dpµq “
!
v P RpNˆpN`1qq
ˇˇˇ
vi`1i ě v
i`1
j @i, j
)
Then Equation (11) is equivalent to the following problem:
sup
vPDpµq
Ş
ˆNi“1Vipµq
piiv
1
i (12)
By Lemma 1, each Vipµq is compact set. Therefore, Dpµq
Ş
ˆVipµq is compact. It is
easy to see that Dpµq
Ş
ˆVipµq is non-empty. By Wierestrass’s theorem, there ex-
ists v˚ solving Equation (12). Then by Lemma 1, there exists P˚i P ∆
2pXq s.t. v˚i “´
EP˚i
rVis, EP˚i
rF1s, . . . , EP˚i
rFNs
¯
and
ˇˇ
supppP˚i q
ˇˇ
ď pN ` 2q ¨ |X|. Therefore,
`
P˚1 , . . . , P
˚
N
˘
solves Equation (11) and we get the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If Θ is finite, then @µ P ∆pXq, there exists
`
P˚1 , . . . , P
˚
N
˘
P ∆2pXqN solving
Equation (11) and each
ˇˇ
supppP˚i q
ˇˇ
ď pN ` 2q ¨ |X|.
Proposition 4 states that it is WLOG to consider only mechanisms with finite sup-
port when solving Equation (11). Therefore, it is sufficient to maximize over NpN `
2q ¨ |X| posterior beliefs and NpN ` 2q ¨ |X| corresponding probabilities to solve con-
strained optimization problem Equation (11), which is a computationally tractable
problem.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I study the set of all possible combinations of expected valuations
that can be implemented by designing information. I show that the set can be im-
plemented only using information structures with finite realizations, and all extreme
points of the set can be characterized using a concavification characterization. I devel-
oped a Lagrange method in the information design setup, and applied the results to
various applications including static and dynamic information acquisition, persuasion
of receivers with outside options and screening using information.
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A. Theorems used in proof
Here are key theorems used formy proof. Theorem 6 is Straszewicz’s theorem (Straszewicz
(1935), see Theorem 18.6 of Rockafellar (1969)). Theorem 7 is Krein-Milman theorem(see The-
orem 3.23 of Rudin (1991)). Theorem 8 is Carathe´odory’s theorem (Carathe´odory (1907)).The-
orem 9 is Prokhorov’s theorem (see Theorem 5.1 of Billingsley (2013))
Theorem 6. Let C P Rn be a closed convex set, cl pexppCqq “ extpCq.
Theorem 7. Let C P Rn be a compact and convex set, C “ convpextpCqq.
Theorem 8. Let C P Rn, if x P convpCq then x P convpRq for R Ă C, |R| ď n` 1.
Theorem 9. A tight set Π of probability measures on Borel sets of metric topological space X is relative
compace in weak-˚ topology.
Lemma 4. Let C be a convex set in Rn. Then @F P FpCq, extpFq Ă extpCq.
Proof. @x P extpFq there exists affine f defining face F. @y, z P C. Suppose y P F, then f pxq “
f pyq. If there exists α P p0, 1q s.t. αy ` p1 ´ αqz “ x, then α f pyq ` p1 ´ αq f pzq “ f pxq ùñ
f pzq “ f pxq “ f pyq so z P F. Since x P extpFq, x P ty, zu. Suppose y R F, then f pxq “
α f pyq ` p1´ αq f pzq ă f pxq by definition of f , contradiction. To sum up, x P extpCq. Q.E.D.
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